Nova Law Review
Volume 38, Issue 1

2013

Article 4

2013 Survey of Juvenile Law
Michael J. Dale∗

∗

Copyright c 2013 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr

Dale: 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law

2013 SURVEY OF JUVENILE LAW
MICHAEL J. DALE*
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 81
DEPENDENCY ................................................................................... 82
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS .............................................. 86
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ................................................................. 89
CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 99

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court of Florida decided three cases this past year
involving juveniles, all in the delinquency field involving significant but
technical matters.1 In the first case, the court held that it was necessary to prove
that a school police officer was the designee of the school principal in order for a
juvenile to be adjudicated for committing trespass on school grounds.2 In the
second case, the court held, over a dissent, that a juvenile who committed several
acts of indirect criminal contempt could be sentenced to consecutive periods of
secure detention for each of the two offenses,3 thus resolving a conflict in the
district courts of appeal.4 In the third case, the court held that a juvenile detention
center falls within the criminal law definition of a detention facility.5
The intermediate appellate courts were quite busy in the juvenile
delinquency field, deciding both important issues and also reversing regretful
fundamental errors by the trial courts.6 In the dependency and termination of
parental rights (“TPR”) field, the appellate courts were less busy, but
*

Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center. This
survey covers cases decided during the period from July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013. The
author thanks law librarian Robert Beharriell, Esq. for his help in the preparation of this survey.
1.
J.M. v. Gargett (J.M. II), 101 So. 3d 352, 355 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam);
Hopkins v. State (Hopkins II), 105 So. 3d 470, 471 (Fla. 2012); J.R. v. State, 99 So. 3d 427, 427–
28 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
2.
J.R., 99 So. 3d at 428.
3.
Compare J.M. II, 101 So. 3d at 356, with J.M. II, 101 So. 3d at 357
(Quince, J., dissenting).
4.
J.M. II, 101 So. 3d at 353, 357. Compare J.M. v. Gargett (J.M. I), 53 So. 3d
1245, 1248 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 58 So. 3d 260 (Fla. 2011), (unpublished
table decision), aff’d, 101 So. 3d 352 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam), with M.P. v. State, 988 So. 2d
1266, 1267 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
5.
Hopkins II, 105 So. 3d at 471.
6.
P.R. v. State, 97 So. 3d 980, 981, 985 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012); G.G. v.
State, 84 So. 3d 1162, 1163–64 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).

Published by NSUWorks, 2013

1

Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 4

82

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

nonetheless, decided several important cases.7 And again, some of the opinions
involved rudimentary trial court error.8
II.

DEPENDENCY

Issues regarding non-offending parents come up regularly in the
appellate decisions in Florida, including issues of due process.9 In A.S. v.
Department of Children & Family Services (In re Interest of E.G-S.),10 a
dependency petition was filed against a mother who was divorced and in which
the petitioner made no allegation against the father.11 After a trial on the
petition, the court found the child dependent and ordered the child placed with
the non-offending father, terminated its jurisdiction along with Department of
Children and Families’ (“DCF” or “Department”) supervision.12 The mother
based her appeal on a violation of her due process rights, resulting in the court’s
termination of jurisdiction and supervision, without a hearing.13 The appellate
court agreed.14 The mother was entitled to notice that the court would determine
the child’s permanent placement at the dispositional hearing, and further that “a
court may not place [the] child permanently with [the] non-offending parent
when the offending parent is either in substantial compliance with [the]
reunification . . . plan or the time for compliance has not expired.”15 The court
then remanded for an “evidentiary hearing to determine whether allowing the
case to remain pending while [the mother] complete[d] her case plan would be
detrimental to the child’s interest, and . . . whether a preponderance of the
evidence support[ed] changing the goal of [the] case plan” to custody for the
father.16
In F.O. v. Department of Children & Families,17 a father appealed an
order after the adjudicatory hearing found no evidence that he abused,
abandoned, or neglected the children, and entered the mother consent plea to the
petition for dependency.18 The problem was that the trial court nonetheless

7.
See infra Parts II, III.
8.
See id.
9.
See Michael J. Dale, 2011 Survey of Juvenile Law, 36 NOVA L. REV. 179, 180
(2011) [hereinafter Dale, 2011 Survey of Juvenile Law].
10.
113 So. 3d 77 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
11.
Id. at 78.
12.
Id.
13.
Id. at 79–80.
14.
Id. at 80.
15.
In re Interest of E.GS., 113 So. 3d at 79.
16.
Id. at 80.
17.
94 So. 3d 709 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
18.
Id. at 709–10.
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ordered the father to participate in the case plan.19 Relying upon two earlier
intermediate appellate court decisions, but without any discussion, the appellate
court held that even when the parent had not been found to have abused,
neglected, or abandoned the child at issue, the parent could be ordered to
participate in the case plan.20
In M.P. v. Department of Children & Family Services (In re Interest of
T.B. & T.P.),21 the issue was whether temporary legal custody could be shared
with DCF in a case where the dependency adjudication by consent was made as
to the father, but an order of dependency was withheld as to the mother, except
for the case plan for the children.22 In its order, the trial court determined that
remaining in the mother’s custody, with protective supervision, was in the best
interests of the children.23 However, the order also determined that the mother
“share temporary physical custody of the children” with the DCF.24 Given the
trial court’s grant of legal custody of the children to the mother, it was reversible
error to also order temporary physical custody of the children to the
Department.25
Once parents have completed tasks assigned to them pursuant to a case
plan after a finding of or consent to dependency, they may seek reunification
with their children.26 However, a trial court must determine if the parents
“compli[ed] with the case plan” and if “reunification [is] detrimental to the
child” before considering an order of reunification.27 In addition, “[t]he court is
also [obligated] to make written . . . findings as to the six statutory factors.”28 In
Department of Children & Families v. W.H.,29 the trial court failed to make
findings on a number of the statutory factors.30 Nor was there competent
evidence in support of finding the factors; DCF did not have notice that a
hearing may result in the possibility of reunification, and no evidence of the issue

19.
Id. at 710.
20.
Id.
21.
107 So. 3d 515 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
22.
Id. at 516.
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
25.
Id. at 516–17.
26.
FLA. STAT. § 39.522(2) (2013); see also id. §§ .521(d)(9), .6011(1).
27.
Id. § 39.522(2); Dep’t of Children & Families v. W.H., 109 So. 3d 1269,
1270 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting C.D. v. Dep’t of Children & Families,
974 So. 2d 495, 500 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).
28.
FLA. STAT. § 39.621(10); W.H., 109 So. 3d at 1270.
29.
109 So. 3d 1269 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam).
30.
Id. at 1270.
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was presented at trial.31 The appellate court reversed given the absence of both
notice and “an evidentiary hearing on reunification.”32
In State Department of Children & Families v. B.D.,33 the trial court
adjudicated the child dependent and placed the child with her maternal cousin as
permanent guardian.34 Subsequently, the mother’s motion was granted and DCF
was ordered to reinstate protective supervision, “without scheduling or holding
an evidentiary hearing or setting out specific findings of fact.”35 From that order,
the Department sought certiorari.36 The appellate court issued a writ quashing
the trial court’s order.37 The appellate court opined that the trial court order
departed from the essential requirements of law as it “failed to make specific,
required findings of fact addressing the child’s best interest[s], stating the
circumstances that caused the . . . dependency, and explaining [why the]
circumstances [were] resolved.”38 The appellate court then added:
“Time is of the essence for . . . children in [a] dependency
system.” . . . [T]he court’s failure to comply with the express
requirements of the law significantly disrupts what was supposed to
be a permanent guardianship, leav[ing] the child’s status in a
continuing state of uncertainty, subject[ing] the child to [a] risk of
harm, and requir[ing] immediate relief that cannot be provided at
39
some uncertain future time on plenary appeal.

In a third case, a mother appealed from an order granting the state’s
motion for reunification with her two children, closing the case as to a third
child, and placing that third child with the father.40 The appellate court held,
quite simply, that an evidentiary hearing must be held where there are disputed
facts concerning the “detriment to the child,” allowing an offending parent to
contest the issue.41 As “the [trial] court made findings of fact without
conducting an evidentiary hearing,” this was a reversible error.42

31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
102 So. 3d 707 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
34.
Id. at 708.
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
B.D., 102 So. 3d at 710.
39.
Id. at 711 (citation omitted) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 39.621(1) (2013)).
40.
B.W. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 114 So. 3d 243, 244 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2013) (per curiam).
41.
Id. at 249.
42.
Id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss1/4

4

Dale: 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law

2013]

2013 SURVEY OF JUVENILE LAW

85

For over two decades, the Florida courts have dealt with dependency
determinations based upon prospective neglect.43 In the leading case, Padgett v.
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,44 the Supreme Court of Florida
held that in order to make a finding of prospective neglect, there must be “a
nexus between the parent’s problem and the potential for future neglect.”45 The
issue arose again in J.V. v. Department of Children & Family Services (In re
Interest of J.J.V.).46 In that case, a father appealed an order adjudicating his son
dependent.47 The basis for the petition to adjudicate the child dependent was
that the father was a danger to the son because the father was a member of the
Bloods gang; the police officer testified that the father’s gang involvement was
proven by his numerous tattoos.48 The twenty-three year old father obtained
some of the tattoos as a teenager.49 Both the DCF and the Guardian Ad Litem
(“GAL”) Program conceded error, and the appellate court recognized that while
tattoos may indicate previous gang association, there was nothing to indicate his
involvement in any criminal activity since he was released from prison two years
earlier; further, all other testimony was that he “had been . . . diligent in visiting
his son and offering financial support.”50
Finally, in a case of first impression, perhaps nationally, in R.L.R. v.
State,51 a seventeen-year-old minor in a dependency case sought a writ of
mandamus to compel a reversal of the trial court’s order, “directing the [child’s]
Attorneys Ad Litem [(“AAL”)] to disclose the [child’s] whereabouts,” to whom
the child had formerly provided this information and requested that it not be
shared.52 The trial court “recognize[d] the attorney-client privilege, but [found]
the disclosure [was] required ‘for the proper administration of justice.’”53
Finding no exception to the attorney-client privilege that would support the trial

43.
See 1 MICHAEL J. DALE ET AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT ¶ 4.14(4)(d)
(2013); Dale, 2011 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 9, at 182; Michael J. Dale, 2004 Survey of
Florida Juvenile Law, 29 NOVA L. REV. 397, 413 (2005).
44.
577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
45.
See id. at 568, 571; see also S.T. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re
Interest of K.C. & D.C.), 87 So. 3d 827, 833–34 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012); R.M. v. Dep’t of
Children & Family Servs. (In re Interest of J.B.), 40 So. 3d 917, 918 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010)
(citing N.D. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re Interest of T.B.), 939 So. 2d 1192, 1194
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
46.
99 So. 3d 578, 579 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
47.
Id. at 578.
48.
Id. at 579.
49.
Id.
50.
Id. at 578, 580.
51.
116 So. 3d 570 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
52.
Id. at 571, 572 n.2.
53.
Id. at 571.
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court’s order to disclose, the appellate court reversed.54 In doing so, it relied in
part on the brief of amicus curiae the Florida Association of Counsel for
Children, the Juvenile Law Center of Philadelphia, the National Association of
Counsel for Children, and the Youth Law Center of San Francisco55 for the
proposition that any exceptions to the lawyer-client privilege in certain lower
court cases were inapposite.56 Finally, the appellate court recognized that
“[c]ourts and legislatures in other jurisdictions have recognized and enforced the
attorney-client privilege in dependency proceedings.”57
III.

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

Just as parents are statutorily entitled to counsel in dependency
proceedings in Florida by statute, they are entitled to counsel in TPR proceedings
as a matter of constitutional right.58 The same court in Miami that failed to
provide counsel in a dependency case in G.W. v. Department of Children &
Families59 during the course of a staccato-case shelter hearing—as discussed in
last year’s survey article60—was reversed in F.M. v. State Department of
Children & Families,61 when it defaulted a father in a termination of parental
rights case when he failed to appear personally, although he appeared
telephonically at the advisory hearing.62 At that hearing, as quoted by the
appellate court, both the mother and father appeared by telephone.63 “When the
judge discovered the father was appearing telephonically, the following brief
exchange took place”:
The Court [calling]: Well that [is] not good enough. You’re
supposed to be here.
The Father [calling]: I could [not] afford it.
The Court [calling]: Well, that [is] really too bad.
DCF [calling]: How is he on the phone?
54.
Id. at 573–74.
55.
Brief on file with the Nova Law Review.
56.
R.L.R., 116 So. 3d at 571, 573 n.5.
57.
Id. at 574 n.8.
58.
In re Interest of D.B. & D.S., 385 So. 2d 83, 87 (Fla. 1980); Dale, 2011
Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 9, at 179.
59.
92 So. 3d 307 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
60.
Michael J. Dale, 2012 Survey of Florida Juvenile Law, 37 NOVA L. REV. 333,
334 (2013) [hereinafter Dale, 2012 Survey of Juvenile Law].
61.
95 So. 3d 378 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
62.
Id. at 382–83.
63.
Id. at 380.
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The Court [calling]: Okay, so go ahead.
Counsel for the mother: With the mother?
DCF [calling]: No, that [is the father]. Judge, well, [the father] is
present via phone. There is publication. His attorney over there [in
Louisiana] was noticed to be present.
The Court [calling]: He is not present. I am granting the termination
of parental rights and closing the case. Mr. M. has no contact with
his children.
....
The Court [calling]: . . . Well, he [is] not here, and a default has been
issued. Mr. M., your parental rights have been terminated and you
64
have no contact whatsoever with these children.

Citing prior case law to the effect that the “‘termination of parental
rights [ought] never be determined on a default basis or by gotcha practices
when [the] parent makes a reasonable [attempt] to be present at [the] hearing and
is delayed by circumstances beyond [that parent’s] control,’” the appellate court
reversed the termination of parental rights.65
The issue of whether parental rights can be terminated based upon the
abuse of a sibling or another child in the family, is predicated upon a showing of
a totality of the circumstances surrounding the current petition by applying the
Padgett nexus test.66 The issue before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in
A.J. v. Department of Children & Families67 was whether a father’s parental
rights to five children should be terminated because, while there was proof of
sexual abuse as to two daughters, the record did not provide support for a finding
harm or a risk of harm with regard to their two brothers.68 While there was
evidence of mental health problems with the two boys, it was unclear if the
issues stemmed from the domestic abuse.69 On that basis, the appellate court
reversed as to the brothers.70

64.
Id. at 380–81 (alteration in original).
65.
Id. at 381, 382–83 (quoting B.H. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 882 So. 2d
1099, 1100 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
66.
Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla.
1991).
67.
97 So. 3d 985 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam).
68.
Id. at 986.
69.
Id. at 987–88.
70.
Id. at 986.
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In G.O. v. Department of Children & Families,71 the appellate court
reversed as a matter of statutory construction because the general magistrate who
presided over the advisory hearing found that the parents gave constructive
consent for TPR by not appearing, and later allowed the guardian ad litem to
testify as to the child’s best interest.72 The trial court signed an order that
conformed to the general magistrate recommendation for TPR.73 Under Florida
law, general magistrates are prohibited from presiding over advisory hearings.74
The hearing at which the guardian ad litem testified “was an adjudicatory
hearing on the petition for [TPR].”75 The appellate court reversed, since the
proper court presiding over the adjudicatory hearing should have been the trial
court.76
The rights of putative fathers in TPR and adoption cases are limited in
Florida by statute.77 In only one case, Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A.,78 has the
Supreme Court of Florida addressed the constitutionality of the adoption statute
as it relates to putative fathers.79 In S.C. v. Gift of Life Adoptions,80 an adoption
agency filed a petition to terminate a father’s parental rights as a precursor to an
adoption involving a biological mother who intended to place the child up for
adoption with the agency.81 The appellate court affirmed and granted the
petition to terminate the putative father’s parental rights, but avoided any
constitutional claim, finding that there was abandonment, which independently
supported the granting of the petition.82 The father had argued that he was not
appointed counsel in a timely fashion “until the first hearing on the petition.”83
The court did recognize “that the filing requirements [were] very technical and
might be a challenge to the nonlawyer biological father,”84 and in his
concurrence, Judge Davis expressed his concern that unwed biological fathers

71.
100 So. 3d 232 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
72.
Id. at 233.
73.
Id.
74.
FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.257(h); G.O., 100 So. 3d at 233.
75.
G.O., 100 So. 3d at 233.
76.
Id.
77.
FLA. STAT. §§ 63.053(1), .054(1) (2013).
78.
963 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2007).
79.
Id. at 191. See Michael J. Dale, 2007–2008 Survey of Juvenile Law, 33
NOVA L. REV. 357, 388 (2009) [hereinafter Dale, 2007–2008 Survey of Juvenile Law] for a
discussion of the possible constitutional infirmities in the Florida law.
80.
100 So. 3d 774 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam).
81.
Id. at 774–75.
82.
Id. at 775.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
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should be entitled to all the due process rights of other parties, including the right
to counsel.85
IV.

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

The question of how indirect criminal contempt applies in juvenile
delinquency cases was before the Supreme Court of Florida in J.M. v. Gargett
(J.M. II).86 The specific issue was whether, when an adjudicated delinquent
violates a single probation order on multiple occasions, that juvenile may be held
in contempt and placed in a secure detention facility for consecutive periods.87
In the case at bar, the juvenile was placed on probation and was held in indirect
criminal contempt as a result of violating curfew, as well as violation of a second
order to obey household rules.88 The juvenile was placed in secure detention for
both offenses; five days for the first offense and fifteen days for the second.89
Specifically, after the first period was satisfied, the second period began.90 The
Supreme Court of Florida—recognizing a split in opinions between the Second
and Fifth District Courts of Appeal—held that the consecutive sentences could
properly be instituted.91 Justices Quince and Pariente dissented on the grounds
that there was “only a single act of indirect contempt” under the Florida
dependency statute.92
In the second case before the Supreme Court of Florida this year, the
issue involved a school-related matter.93 Juveniles are often the subject of
delinquency cases that arise out of events which occur at school.94 The issue in
J.R. v. State95 was whether a juvenile could be found to have committed a
trespass on school grounds without evidence that the juvenile had formerly been
warned by the school principal’s designee for trespassing.96 The Supreme Court
85.
S.C., 100 So. 3d at 776 (Davis, J., concurring).
86.
101 So. 3d 352, 353 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
87.
Id. at 355.
88.
Id. at 353.
89.
Id.
90.
Id. at 353–54.
91.
J.M. II, 101 So. 3d at 356–57. Compare J.M. I, 53 So. 3d 1245, 1247 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 58 So. 3d 260 (Fla. 2011) (unpublished table decision), aff’d,
101 So. 3d 352 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam), with M.P. v. State, 988 So. 2d 1266, 1267 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 2008).
92.
J.M. II, 101 So. 3d at 357 (Quince, J., dissenting).
93.
J.R. v. State, 99 So. 3d 427, 427 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
94.
See 2 MICHAEL J. DALE ET AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT ¶ 10.07(1)
(2013).
95.
99 So. 3d 427 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
96.
Id. at 427 (citing D.J. v. State, 43 So. 3d 176, 177 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.),
review granted, 47 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2010) (unpublished table decision), and quashed, 67 So. 3d
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of Florida held that the failure to present evidence at trial that the individuals
who warned the child were designees of the school’s principal was reversible
error.97 In addition, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the trial court failed
to properly comply with the conditions for taking judicial notice under Florida’s
rules of evidence.98
The third case in the Supreme Court of Florida was Hopkins v. State
(Hopkins II),99 in which the court decided the question of whether a detainee’s
act of battery at a juvenile detention center, and charged with battery falls under
Florida’s criminal law within this setting.100 Resolving a question of conflict
between the First and Fourth District Courts of Appeal—as a matter of statutory
construction—the court found that a detention center does qualify as a detention
facility for purposes of the criminal law.101
In what would seem like a simple proposition, juvenile court jurisdiction
over a subject child in delinquency ends at age nineteen.102 In State v. E.I.,103 the
appellate court—in a one-paragraph opinion—dismissed the State’s appeal as
moot, as the juvenile had reached his nineteenth birthday.104 However, the court
explained that the trial court was correct and that its jurisdiction ends over any
child at any time after the juvenile’s nineteenth birthday, “[u]nless [the] child is
already under commitment, in a transition program, or subject to a restitution
order.”105
The rules concerning a determination of whether a juvenile is
incompetent to proceed in a delinquency case are quite clear.106 Among them is
the provision that the court must base its competency determination on the
evaluation of at least “two . . . experts appointed by the court.”107 In State v.
D.V.,108 following an unauthorized absence, the juvenile was charged with
threatening school personnel.109 The juvenile allegedly slapped another student
1029 (Fla. 2011)).
97.
Id. at 430.
98.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.201(1) (2013).
99.
105 So. 3d 470 (Fla. 2012).
100.
Id. at 471.
101.
Id.; see also State v. Hopkins (Hopkins I), 47 So. 3d 974, 975 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2010), review granted, 63 So. 3d 749 (Fla. 2011) (unpublished table decision), aff’d,
105 So. 3d 470 (Fla. 2012); T.C. v. State, 852 So. 2d 276, 276 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (per
curiam).
102.
FLA. STAT. § 985.0301(5)(a).
103.
114 So. 3d 309 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam).
104.
Id. at 310.
105.
Id.
106.
See FLA. STAT. § 985.19.
107.
Id. § 985.19(1)(b).
108.
111 So. 3d 234 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
109.
Id. at 235.
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seven weeks later.110 Formerly, the juvenile had been adjudicated incompetent
to proceed after allegations were raised with respect to the commission other
crimes.111 The first expert appointed by the court evaluated the mental condition
of the child and “determined that [the child] was not competent to proceed.”112
The court did not appoint a second expert, relying upon an earlier report from an
expert who had been appointed by the Department of Children and Families, on
the grounds that one could save money in so doing.113 The appellate court
reversed, finding that as a matter of statutory construction the trial court is
required to base determinations of competency on the evaluations of at least two
court-appointed experts.114 As the court only appointed one expert, reversal was
required.115
Issues of the suppression of inculpatory statements by juveniles have
been the source of discussion in this survey on a number of occasions.116 In
State v. M.R.,117 one of the issues on appeal was whether a statement that the
juvenile—who was subsequently “charged in a petition for . . . possession with
intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver cannabis within 1000 feet of a school”—
made in front of his mother and in the presence of a police officer could be
suppressed.118 The police officer had called the mother, and when the mother
arrived, the juvenile was sitting, handcuffed, in the rear of a police car in custody
and in the presence of the officer.119 The child said to his mother that he did not
wish to talk to her in the presence of a police “officer and that she . . . knew why
he was selling marijuana.”120 In this case, the respondent child did not request to
speak with the third person––his mother––but rather, it was the police officer
that brought the mother to the scene.121 The court held that “these statements . . .
were an exploitation of the initial illegality,” citing a prior District Court of
Appeal case as distinguishable in Lundberg v. State.122
This survey does not usually discuss evidentiary issues, as they are
generic in nature and not necessarily specific to juvenile delinquency cases.
110.
Id.
111.
Id.
112.
Id. at 235–36.
113.
D.V., 111 So. 3d at 236–37.
114.
Id. at 237.
115.
Id.
116.
See Michael J. Dale, 2010 Survey of Juvenile Law, 35 NOVA L. REV. 137, 151
(2010); Dale, 2007–2008 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 79, at 384–85.
117.
100 So. 3d 272 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
118.
Id. at 274, 279–80.
119.
Id. at 275, 280–81.
120.
Id. at 275.
121.
Id. at 275, 280–81.
122.
M.R., 100 So. 3d at 280–81 (citing Lundberg v. State, 918 So. 2d 444, 445
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
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However, on occasion, the issue is germane to juvenile delinquency law.123 In
D.D.B. v. State,124 the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that the juvenile
called “‘911 for the purpose of making a false alarm or complaint or reporting
false information.’”125 In an adjudicatory hearing, “the State . . . introduce[d] an
audio recording of [the] two calls purportedly made.”126 The problem was quite
simple.127 The identification of the child’s voice on the recording required
“authentication, [which] would also require . . . evidence, including [the fact]
that the recording was of a telephone call received and handled by the 911
system on the relevant date.”128 Since there was no such evidence under section
90.901 of the Florida Evidence Code, the court was obligated to reverse.129
The second evidentiary matter, also seemingly basic in nature, arose in
K.A.A. v. State.130 In that case a juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for the
unlawful possession of gun on school property.131 The trial court would not
allow the respondent “to cross-examine the State’s juvenile witness about
criminal charges pending against the witness.”132 Citing an earlier case to the
effect that “‘[t]he right to cross-examine witnesses . . . outweighs the [interest of
the State] in preserving the confidentiality of juvenile delinquency records,’”133
the appellate court reversed.134 It ought to have been obvious that the
prosecution witness’s credibility would be an issue.135
It has been forty-six years since the Supreme Court of the United States
ruled in In re Gault136 that children have the right to counsel in juvenile
delinquency cases.137 In C.W. v. State,138 a juvenile appealed from an order
adjudicating her as delinquent based upon a battery on a law enforcement
officer.139 The issue was the court’s action in taking the case to trial in the

123.

See, e.g., D.D.B. v. State, 109 So. 3d 1184, 1185 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

109 So. 3d 1184 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
Id. at 1184.
Id. at 1185.
See id.
Id.
D.D.B., 109 So. 3d at 1185; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.901 (2013).
109 So. 3d 1175, 1176 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Tuell v. State, 905 So. 2d 929, 930 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
See K.A.A., 109 So. 3d at 1176.
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 41, 55.
93 So. 3d 514 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
Id. at 515.

2013).

2005)).
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absence of a lawyer for the child.140 At the child’s arraignment, the child
indicated that she hired an attorney.141 The court asked if she was sure that she
would have the attorney represent her, since the attorney had not yet filed any
pleadings.142 On the date of trial, the child indicated that she was not sure where
her attorney was, and the court said that it was going to trial.143 After the trial,
but before the disposition, an attorney was hired and filed a motion for
rehearing.144 Incredibly, the court denied the motion for rehearing, noting that
the child ‘“did indeed have a fair trial.’”145 Citing to the Florida Rules of
Juvenile Procedure which require notification of the right to counsel at each
stage of the proceeding and—if the child chooses to waive counsel—conducting
a thorough inquiry to determine if the waiver was freely and intelligently made,
the appellate court reversed.146
In Florida, determinations of whether an alleged juvenile delinquent is to
be securely detained are based upon the use of a Risk Assessment Instrument
(“RAI”).147 In J.L.B. v. Kelly,148 a juvenile petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus, challenging the validity of the detention during the course of the juvenile
delinquency proceeding.149 Although he was released from detention while his
writ was pending—and thus the matter was moot—the court on appeal ruled that
“improper scoring of [a RAI] . . . is capable of repetition yet evading review,”
and thus it resolved the issue.150 The claim involved impermissible double
scoring.151 The trial court added points to the scoring process on the basis of two
factors: “[T]he high risk nature of [a] prior commitment and the circumstances
of the current burglary offense.”152 The problem was that by doing so, the court
impermissibly double-scored by acknowledging circumstances that had already
been taken into account by the RAI, there was nothing in the State statute that
would allow the court to do so.153

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.
Id.
C.W., 93 So. 3d at 515.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 515–16 (quoting FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.165(a), (b)(2)).
Dale, 2007–2008 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 79, at 380–81.
93 So. 3d 1137 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
Id. at 1138.
Id. (citing T.T. v. Esteves, 828 So. 2d 449, 450 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.

151.
152.
153.

Id. at 1139.
Id. at 1138.
J.L.B., 93 So. 3d at 1139 (citing FLA. STAT. § 985.24 (2013)).

2002)).
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The State charged a juvenile with felony criminal mischief—valued at
$1000 or more—for $2600 of damage to an automobile.154 The auto body shop
owner testified in support of the value of the damage, based on an employee’s
estimate.155 The estimate was made in the regular course of business, but the
estimate was never admitted into evidence.156 When the trial court refused to
strike the oral testimony, trial counsel objected, and the matter in A.S. v. State157
went up on appeal.158 The appellate court reversed on the basis of the Florida
Rules of Evidence, specifically section 90.803(6), regarding the business records
exception to hearsay.159 Here, the estimate itself would have qualified as a
business record.160 “[H]owever, the testimony explaining the contents of the
estimate,” where the estimate was not in evidence, did not fall within the
exception.161 As a result, there was no competent proof of the underlying felony
crime and the court reversed.162
Restitution issues come up regularly at the dispositional stage of
delinquency cases in Florida; issues also regularly discussed in this survey.163 A
blatantly obvious reversal took place in X.G. v. State,164 where the juvenile
appealed from the revocation of juvenile probation where the court’s basis for
revocation and probation was the failure to pay restitution.165 The problem
concerned a plea agreement, which stated that “no restitution would be ordered
on the [underlying] charge.”166 Thus, the disposition order did not list restitution
as a condition of probation.167
In A.P. v. State,168 the issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to
support a restitution order.169 The source of the evidence resulting in an order of
$220 in restitution was the victim’s testimony, which was based upon the

154.
A.S. v. State, 91 So. 3d 270, 271 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam).
155.
Id.
156.
Id.
157.
91 So. 3d 270 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam).
158.
See id. at 271.
159.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.803(6)(a) (2013) (amended by Act effective May
30, 2013, ch. 2013-98, § 1, 2013 Fla. Laws 1, 1–2).
160.
A.S., 91 So. 3d at 271.
161.
Id.
162.
Id.
163.
Dale, 2012 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 60, at 346; Michael J. Dale,
2009 Survey of Juvenile Law, 34 NOVA L. REV. 199, 216 (2009); Dale, 2007–2008 Survey of
Juvenile Law, supra note 79, at 378.
164.
106 So. 3d 90 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
165.
Id. at 91.
166.
Id. at 90.
167.
Id.
168.
114 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
169.
Id. at 395.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss1/4

14

Dale: 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law

2013]

2013 SURVEY OF JUVENILE LAW

95

replacement value of the item, and the source of the testimony was unknown.170
Thus, according to the appellate court, the State failed to present competent
substantial evidence of the item’s fair market value.171
Among the requirements at the dispositional stage of the delinquency
proceeding in Florida, is that the court strictly comply with the statutory
provisions governing proper procedure at a juvenile disposition hearing.172 In
K.P. v. State,173 while the court ordered a predisposition psychiatric evaluation of
the child, the court entered a dispositional order before the psychiatric evaluation
was available.174 That constituted failure to strictly comply with the statutory
procedures, and the appellate court reversed.175 Similarly, at the dispositional
stage, the trial court is obligated to prepare a written dispositional order that
complies with its oral pronouncements.176 In L.D. v. State,177 the trial court
failed to do so.178 It was conceded that the court’s written dispositional order
was not consistent with its oral pronouncements.179 On the basis of the lower
court’s failure to comply with the statutory obligations, the appellate court
reversed.180
Similarly, in R.V. v. State,181 the appellate court reversed the
dispositional order of the trial court because there had been no articulation
regarding why the dispositional alternative of a moderate risk commitment
program is more appropriate than the Department of Juvenile Justice’s
recommendation that the child’s rehabilitative needs should result in the least
restrictive setting.182 The appellate court reversed, authorizing the “trial court
[to] amend [its] disposition[al] order to include the required findings.”183
Perhaps even harder to understand is the situation which required a
reversal of a disposition in M.A.L. v. State.184 In that case, the trial court
170.
Id.
171.
Id.
172.
K.P. v. State, 97 So. 3d 966, 967 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (citing K.D.
v. State, 911 So. 2d 885, 886 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005)); see also FLA. STAT. § 985.43(2)
(2013).
173.
97 So. 3d 966 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
174.
Id. at 967.
175.
Id.
176.
L.D. v. State, 107 So. 3d 514, 515 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013); see also
FLA. STAT. § 985.43(2).
177.
107 So. 3d 514 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
178.
Id. at 515.
179.
Id.
180.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 985.43(2).
181.
107 So. 3d 535 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam).
182.
Id. at 536.
183.
Id.
184.
110 So. 3d 493, 495–96, 499 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
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conducted a dispositional hearing outside of the appellant and her father’s
presence, in a sidebar.185 The juvenile “claim[ed] that [the] sidebar conference
violated her due process rights to be present and meaningfully heard prior to the
disposition.”186 Shockingly, the State argued that this was harmless error.187 The
appellate court reversed, recognizing that the issue of disposition prior to
determination, in noncompliance with the Florida statute governing how the
hearing should be held, constituted fundamental error.188
Under Florida law, there is a variety of dispositional alternatives in
addition to restitution;189 such alternatives encompass placement in a various
residential facilities, including those described as high-risk.190 In D.H. v.
State,191 the trial court committed a youth to a high-risk facility for a
misdemeanor offense in its dispositional order.192 Florida law limits the trial
court’s commitment authority and placement of the juvenile misdemeanant in a
high-risk facility.193 Thus, the most restrictive facility to which the child could
be sent was a moderate-risk facility; therefore, the appellate court reversed.194
In G.W. v. State,195 juveniles in three consolidated appeals challenged
the constitutionality of a Florida Statute governing sentencing enhancement
when the crime committed was against a school officer.196 The appeal was based
on equal protection grounds and the appellants claimed that the statute created
“‘an elite class of untouchables’” because of the additional protection provided
by the law to school employees.197 Applying a rational basis equal protection
test,198 the appellate court affirmed, finding no constitutional infirmity in the
statute.199
In two major cases decided over the past four years, the Supreme Court
of the United States dealt with questions of appropriate punishment for

185.
Id. at 495.
186.
Id. at 496.
187.
Id.
188.
Id. at 496, 499; see also FLA. STAT. § 985.433(4)(d) (2013).
189.
Compare FLA. STAT. § 985.437, with id. § 985.441.
190.
Id. § 985.441(1)(b); see also id. § 985.03(46).
191.
114 So. 3d 496 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
192.
Id. at 497–98.
193.
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 985.441(2)).
194.
Id. at 498.
195.
106 So. 3d 83 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 118 So. 3d 220 (Fla.
2013) (unpublished table decision).
196.
Id. at 84; see also FLA. STAT. § 784.081(2).
197.
G.W., 106 So. 3d at 84.
198.
Id. at 85 (citing Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., 840 So. 2d 993, 996
(Fla. 2003)).
199.
Id. at 86; see also FLA. STAT. § 784.081(2).
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individuals who were juveniles at the time they committed their crimes.200 In
Roper v. Simmons,201 the Court held that the death penalty for individuals who
committed criminal offenses while juveniles was unconstitutional in violation of
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.202 In
Graham v. Florida,203 the Court held that life without the possibility of parole
for a juvenile was also unconstitutional in a felony murder setting where the
juvenile did not commit the homicide.204 Then, in Miller v. Alabama,205 the
Court ruled that state sentencing statutes making life imprisonment without
parole appropriately mandatory for juvenile non-homicide offenders also violated
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.206 In
three intermediate appellate court opinions decided this past survey year, the
courts dealt with the application of Graham and Miller to three juveniles tried as
adults.207 The first case is Walling v. State.208 There, the defendant, who was
sixteen at the time of the offense, was convicted of felony murder for
participating in the planning of the robbery and supplying the gun, although he
had been “waiting a few blocks away when the fatal shot was fired.”209 He was
tried as an adult by a six-person jury.210 The appellate court held that under
Roper, Graham, and Miller, the juvenile was not entitled to a twelve-person jury
because the twelve-person jury is required when death is a possible penalty and
that death no longer controls the question of a jury’s size when the case involves
a juvenile.211
In Reynolds v. State,212 the defendant had been found guilty by a jury
and sentenced to life in prison on one count of robbery with a firearm in 2002.213
The appellate court vacated the sentence of life without parole under Graham.214

200.
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2017–18 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 555–56 (2005).
201.
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
202.
See id. at 578.
203.
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
204.
Id. at 2034.
205.
132 S. Ct 2455 (2012).
206.
Id. at 2475.
207.
See Reynolds v. State, 116 So. 3d 558, 559 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013);
Young v. State, 110 So. 3d 931, 931–32 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 2013 Fla. LEXIS
2223 (Fla. Oct. 10, 2013); Walling v. State, 105 So. 3d 660, 661–62 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2013).
208.
105 So. 3d 660, 660 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
209.
Id. at 661–62.
210.
Id. at 662.
211.
Id.
212.
116 So. 3d 558 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
213.
Id. at 559.
214.
Id.
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The second issue before the court on remand was “‘the concept of aggregate
sentencing on interdependent offenses, as it relates to [the] trial judge’s desire to
effect the original sentencing plan.’”215 The appellate court held that there is no
right to “‘modification, on remand after appeal, of [the] sentences on convictions
[that were] not challenged on [the original] appeal.’”216 The appellate court
further acknowledged the lack of legal decisions on point with this issue after the
Supreme Court of the United States’ opinion in Graham, although it recognized
general support for the proposition.217 Finally, as the court noted that it was not
unconstitutional for a juvenile to receive a life sentence for a non-homicide
crime.218 Rather, it “is unconstitutional . . . for the State not to give [the]
juvenile offender[] . . . ‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain release.’”219
In a third post-Graham decision, Young v. State,220 the juvenile was
sentenced to four consecutive thirty-year sentences and then was resentenced
pursuant to Graham.221 One of the issues the defendant raised on appeal was
that the trial court violated Graham by “fail[ing] to consider [his] rehabilitation
and newfound maturity.”222 The juvenile’s claim was that he was entitled to a
hearing to prove his change in circumstances.223 The appellate court rejected this
argument under Graham.224 Under the facts of the case, because the juvenile
was sentenced to a term of thirty years in prison, after which he would be
released, he did have a sentence that specifically provided for his eventual
release.225 Therefore, Graham did not apply.226 Finally, the appellate court held
that a resentencing hearing does not require the opportunity to review
rehabilitation.227 On those bases, the court affirmed.228

215.
Id. at 562 (quoting Fasenmyer v. State, 457 So. 2d 1361, 1366 (Fla. 1984)).
216.
Id. (quoting Fasenmyer, 457 So. 2d at 1366).
217.
Reynolds, 116 So. 3d at 562.
218.
Id. at 563.
219.
Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010)).
220.
110 So. 3d 931 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, No. 5C13-929, 2013
WL 5614109 (Fla. 2013).
221.
Id. at 931–32 (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034).
222.
Id. at 932.
223.
Id.
224.
Id. at 933.
225.
Young, 110 So. 3d at 934.
226.
Id.
227.
Id.
228.
Id. at 936.
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CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of Florida decided three important technical matters
in the delinquency field this past survey year.229 In dependency and termination
of parental rights cases, the intermediate appellate courts decided a large number
of cases, a number of which involved obvious and basic failures to comply with
Chapter 39 by the trial courts.230 One case in particular, R.L.R. v. State, was
particularly noteworthy, as it upheld the right of a juvenile to confidentiality with
his volunteer AAL in a dependency case, over the objections of the GAL
Program and the DCF.231

229.
See J.M. II, 101 So. 3d 352, 353 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam); Hopkins II, 105 So.
3d 470, 471 (Fla. 2012); J.R. v. State, 99 So. 3d 427, 430 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
230.
See, e.g., A.J. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 97 So. 3d 985, 986–87 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam).
231.
R.L.R. v. State, 116 So. 3d 570, 574 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).

Published by NSUWorks, 2013

19

